Retaking of the mainland was a critical national policy of the Republic of China’s government during its early years in Taiwan. Scholars have differing opinions on whether Chiang Kai-shek, the leader at the time, truly pushed for a military counterattack or was it merely a propaganda slogan. This talk will use digital humanities methods to analyze the frequency of the keyword “counteroffensive” in Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries and address the following questions:
First, why did records of the counteroffensive peak in 1957?
Second, why did the number plummet in 1960?
Third, why did the records peak again from 1961 to 1965?
Fourth, why did they sharply decrease in 1966?
Fifth, why did they significantly decline after 1968?
Sixth, did Chiang Kai-shek genuinely intend a military counteroffensive, and if so, when did he abandon the plan?
This talk will incorporate the context of the Cold War and global politics to answer these questions and to provide a long-term view of Chiang Kai-shek’s thoughts and actions regarding the counterattack to the mainland.